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Job assignment and the gender wage di¤erential:




We study the determinants of the gender wage di¤erential by using
a data set on Finnish blue-collar metalworkers. The assignment of men
and women into jobs of di¤erent complexity is a key factor that widens
the …nal wage di¤erential. Using the theory of optimal job assignment,
we propose a model of individual productivity, ability and job complexity
and formulate a hypothesis of asymmetric assignment according to which
men and women of equal ability are allocated to di¤erent job levels. Using
econometric panel data techniques, we …nd support for this hypothesis.
The results are consistent with the Lazear-Rosen model of job ladders but
can alternatively be interpreted as evidence for gender discrimination in
job assignment. JEL J31, J50, J71.
1 Introduction
The gender wage di¤erential is an important issue. It is often suspected that
women’s low earnings re‡ect di¤erentiated treatment of the two sexes in the
labour market. Firstly, there may be wage discrimination: women earn lower
wages even when their productivity-related attributes as well as those of their
tasks do not di¤er from those of men. Secondly, even the productivity-related
attributes may di¤er in ways that to many do not seem warranted by purely
economic considerations: women’s career pro…les and job assignments di¤er
from those of men and women tend to be concentrated in …rms and industries
that are less generous wage-payers than male-dominated ones.
¤Some of the results of this paper were presented at the Applied Econometrics Association
Conference on Gender and the Labour Market, Perpignan, April 2-3, 1998. The author is
indebted to Markus Jäntti, Reija Lilja, Pär Lundborg, Tuire Santamäki-Vuori, Ilpo Suoniemi
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1It is notoriously di¢cult to assess to what extent wage di¤erentials and
di¤erent job and employer attributes re‡ect discriminating treatment. As to
outright wage discrimination, it is (in general) impossible to measure individual
productivity independently of wages and thus to compare wages and productiv-
ity directly. Secondly, wages are a¤ected by so many intervening factors that it
is hard to obtain a conclusive statistical proof of wage discrimination. Lastly, to
know whether women would be quali…ed to earn higher wages in more demand-
ing jobs and male-dominated …rms and industries would require counterfactual
observations of women’s performance in positions in which there are at present
few women1. In general, empirical analyses of the wage di¤erential have tended
to show that the di¤erential becomes very small and can even vanish if wages
are conditioned on a large set of variables, including narrowly de…ned occupa-
tional dummies. This has tended to shift the main focus of attention into gender
di¤erences in careers and job assignment.
This paper sheds new light on these issues by analyzing the wages of Finnish
metalworkers. The novel feature of the analysis is a thorough exploitation of
observations on the complexity level of individual jobs. The metalworkers’ col-
lective agreement namely presupposes a fairly thorough evaluation of job at-
tributes, the result of which is an observation on the complexity level of each
job.
We …rst use an Oaxaca decomposition to show that job assignment is an
important determinant of the wage di¤erential. On average, men are allocated
to more demanding jobs than women, and this factor can explain more than
half of the gross wage di¤erential. It is then natural to ask whether the as-
signment process treats men and women asymmetrically. Borrowing from the
literature on optimal assignment (see Sattinger 1993), we suggest a model of
ability, job complexity and earnings which permits an operational formulation
of this asymmetry hypothesis. The hypothesis is tested by using panel data
techniques proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981). The results suggest that
the job assignment process indeed treats men and women di¤erently. However,
discrimination in job assignment and careers is not the only possible interpre-
tation of the results. The observed pattern can also be accommodated with
models based on individual optimization like that of Lazear and Rosen (1990).
2 The metal and engineering industry’s collec-
tive agreement
The wages of Finnish blue-collar metalworkers are legally based on the indus-
try’s collective agreement (henceforth CA) that was gradually introduced in the
late 1980s2. That agreement encompasses practically all of the industry’s …rms
1As Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) point out, the study of comparative advantage is made
di¢cult by the very principle of comparative advantage itself.
2This is the so-called PARAKE-agreement, the aim of which is to relate relative wage
di¤erentials to individual and job-speci…c attributes. It covers all workers whose pay is de…ned
per hour. Salaried employees have separate arrangements.
2and workers. According to the CA, the relative wages of metalworkers are deter-
mined by job complexity, personal achievement and eventual …rm-speci…c and
individual-speci…c arrangements, as follows:
1) All occupations within each …rm have been evaluated according to their
complexity. The criteria for evaluation include the time required to learn to do
the job as well the responsibility and strain that is imposed on the worker. All
occupations within an industry are thereby mapped into a scale of di¢culty.
The evaluation of occupations is carried out by a special expert group that
assesses job attributes3. The collective agreement in turn includes a tabulated
tari¤ wage for each level of complexity. Once a worker has been assigned to an
occupation within the …rm, the tari¤ wage of the corresponding complexity class
becomes the starting point in the determination of his wage. This tari¤ wage is
called his occupation-related wage. The occupation-related wage is based on job
attributes alone is not supposed to change when the person …lling the job slot
changes.
In this paper, we treat the occupation-related wage as a continuous observa-
tion on job complexity, bearing in mind that the variable is measured in wage
space. This choice di¤ers from other analyses, since the job level information
is most often treated as a classifying dummy variable. In our data, about 65
to 70 di¤erent complexity levels appear in the data in a typical year. This is
not as much as one might hope, but perhaps enough to warrant an analysis
in continuous space, in particular because the analysis reported in this paper
would be cumbersome and di¢cult to carry out with a large set of occupational
dummies.
2) In addition, the collective agreement stipulates that a worker’s personal
achievement in the task be re‡ected in his pay. The worker’s performance is
evaluated by a superior who assigns the worker a personal bonus of 2 to 17
percent on top of the occupation-related wage. The CA requires that the distri-
bution of personal bonuses within each wage group within each …rm obeys the
normal distribution. The wage group is derived simply from a coarse partition
of the job complexity axis into three subsets. The most complex jobs are carried
out in wage group 1, the intermediate tasks in group 2 and the simple tasks in
group 3. The point of this conditioning on the wage group and the requirement
of a normal distribution within a group is to avoid a psychologically plausible
outcome in which the highest bonuses would tend to accrue to the most skilled
workers who anyway are located at the high end of the task complexity axis.
Thus, the idea of the bonus is to evaluate the quality of the worker’s input
conditional job complexity.
The bonus-increased wage is called a person’s basic wage. The basic wage is
the person’s fundamental reference wage. It is also the minimum wage that he
can claim in time work.
3) The actual wage outcome is up to the …rm’s wage policy and any idiosyn-
cratic bargains that the …rm and the worker conduct. The employer is bound by
3Thus, the evaluation of job complexity is in principle seen as a genuine observation on the
complexity of the job and not as a free instrument in the hands of the management.
3the minimum requirement set by the basic wage, but nothing prevents the em-
ployer from paying more. Thus, actual pay depends on the methods of payment
and the wage policy chosen by the …rm. However, it is the spirit of the CA that
…nal relative wages should re‡ect the relative di¤erentials of the workers’ basic
wages. Indeed, it is the case that relative di¤erentials in basic wages to a high
extent determine relative di¤erentials in actual wages and that basic wages also
constitute a set of binding minimum wages – conditioned on job complexity –
in the industry4.
The methods of payment fall into two categories: time pay and performance
pay. The latter category is further subdivided into two: piece rates and ”pre-
mium” rates. Premium pay is a mixture of time and piece, so that there is a
…xed hour rate on top of which comes remuneration according to number of
units produced. Many workers share their working hours between two or three
pay schemes. The …nal mean wage per hour can be computed as a weighted
average of pay per hour within each of the three pay schemes. In this study, we
pay most attention to time wages, since most workers have time hours whereas
piece and premium pay are less prevalent. Furthermore, regressions of wages
earned within the di¤erent pay schemes suggest that linear models that best de-
scribe earnings di¤er across schemes, so that di¤erent pay forms are best treated
separately.
3 The Data
The data were collected by systematic sampling from the Finnish Employers
Association’s wage records. Notwithstanding errors in the recording process,
these records are completely comprehensive: they contain the quarterly obser-
vations of all wage variables of all workers within all member …rms (practically
all …rms) in the metal and engineering industry. The 1990 data was ordered
by …rm and within each …rm the workers were ordered according to their mean
pay. A subset of workers was then sampled from this set of workers, by picking
each 15th worker of the set. By using personal codes to identify each worker,
the sample was then continued to years 1991 through 1995 and backwards,
to years 1989 through 1980. For each year, attrition was compensated for by
adding new observations5. In this paper, however, we only use the panel of the
years 1990 through 1995, since it is for these years only that the job complexity
variable is available. As in most countries, the metal industry’s labour force
is predominantly male, so that women amount to about 25% of it in a typical
4For example, a cross section reduction of variance (carried out by the author) indicates
that about 70 per cent of the variation in average hour pay is explained by the job complexity
variable, age and gender variables and the composition of pay schemes (shares of performance
pay and time pay) variables. Adding …rm means raises the adjusted R-square to about 80 per
cent.
5This supplementing was carried out in the following way. For year 1991, say, the worker
population was partitioned into ”newcomers” and ”old” according to whether that year is the
…rst one when the worker in question appears in the industry’s records. The supplementary
workers of the panel were then sampled from among the newcomers.
4year.
From the 5182 sampled workers of year 1990, about half (2517) were observed
in all the subsequent years from 1991 through 1995. Of these 2517 individuals,
1396 performed time work in each of these six years, and most of our analyses
focuses on that subsample of the data.
As to the variables, they include the following:
² Age and sex of worker;
² Money earned and time worked within all pay schemes (time work, piece
work, premium work);
² The level of job complexity and the personal bonus of the worker;
² An employer code that partitions the set of workers into subsets according
to employer identity;
² An area code that partitions the country in two classes (dense metropoli-
tan vs. sparsely populated area).
By using the information of the sample, other variables can be formed. We
have used variables such as
² ”Total experience” = Total number of years in which the workers appears
in the data in years 1980 through 1995. This can be interpreted as a
crude measure of how professionally the individual is engaged in the metal
industry. In a panel estimation, it is invariant and contains information
on future years if used with 1980-1994 data;
² Share of performance work hours (piece plus premium hours) in total hours
of the worker;
² Indicator variables for worker who is either new in his …rm or is just going
to leave the …rm.
4 The wage di¤erential
This section presents the stylized facts of the gender wage di¤erential. Figure
1 depicts two variables: the ratio of female earnings per hour in time work to
male hour earnings; and the ratio of female average earnings per hour to male
earnings. Both ratios stay around 82 percent, approximately. Thus, women
earn about four …fths of male earnings.
Next, we report an Oaxaca decomposition of the log wage di¤erential, using
the data for year 1990 as an example6. The decomposed variable is the log of
the average wage per hour earned in time work, computed over all workers who
carried out time work in year 1990. We use the male wage structure (i.e. the
6See the papers by Oaxaca (1973) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) for the basic idea of
the decomposition.







Time wage Mean earnings
Figure 1: Ratio of female to male earnings per hour, measured by time
wages and mean hour earnings, for Finnish metalworkers in years
1980-1995.
6Constant Age Total Job Total
experience complexity
¯
m 0,481 0,011 0,004 0,857
¯
f 0,473 0,004 0,005 0,879
Xm 1,000 37,320 9,340 3,556
Xf 1,000 40,130 8,420 3,411
¯m(Xm ¡ Xf) 0,000 -0,005 0,003 0,124 0,123
% 0,000 -2,550 1,590 61,110 60,150
Xf(¯m ¡ ¯f) 0,009 0,159 -0,009 -0,077 0,081
% 4,170 77,970 -4,620 -37,680 39,850
SUM 0,009 0,153 -0,006 0,048 0,204
% 4,170 75,420 -3,020 23,430 100,000
Table 1: Oaxaca decomposition of time wages for 1990 data. The e¤ect of age
squared is incorporated into the age contribution entries.
coe¢cients of the linear model estimated from the male subsample) as the refer-
ence structure. This is not an uncontroversial choice, but is perhaps warranted
by the fact that male workers constitute about three quarters of the industry’s
workforce7. The main point of this exercise is to show that the di¤erence in
average job complexity is one of the main factors that contributes to the overall
wage di¤erential. Table 1 reports the results of this decomposition in which we
have used age (plus age squared), total experience and log of job complexity as
explanatory factors. The …rst two rows display the coe¢cients, ¯
m for men and
¯
f for women, of each variable in a linear model estimated for the 1990 cross-
section. The next two rows, Xm and Xf, display the means of the variables
for the male and female subsample, respectively. The next row, ¯m(Xm ¡Xf)
shows the contribution, to the overall wage di¤erential, of the di¤erence in male
and female average of the variable in question. The next row displays the rel-
ative share of that contribution within the overall wage di¤erential. The row
Xf(¯m ¡ ¯f) in turn displays the contribution of di¤erential treatment asso-
ciated with each variable and the next row in turn shows the relative share of
that contribution. The last row sums both factors for each variable whereas
the last column sums, over all variables, the contributions of di¤erent means
and those of di¤erential treatment. Thus, the last entry of the SUM row is the
overall wage di¤erential of 20.4 per cent. A negative entry in a cell means that
the contribution in question diminishes the wage di¤erential.
We see that age and job complexity are the important factors that contribute
to the wage di¤erential. The di¤erence in average job complexity accounts for
61 per cent of the total wage di¤erential of 20 per cent. Yet there is an intriguing
pattern: the coe¢cient of complexity is higher for women, and this generates a
negative contribution to the wage di¤erential. The di¤erential treatment of age
7See Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) and Neumark (1988) for a thorough discussion on the
choice of the reference structure.
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Figure 2: Empirical density function of job complexity for male and
female workers, 1990 data.
can explain almost four …fths of the overall di¤erential.
Thus, broadly, women are in less complex jobs, although being in a more
complex job brings greater rewards to women than for men. Moreover, men’s
wages increase with age, in contrast to women’s. We emphasize that the above
decomposition is presented as a crude empirical characterization that motivates
the subsequent sections. By itself, it would warrant a more careful analysis of
the role of the di¤erent variables. In particular, interpreting the coe¢cients and
contributions of a variable like job complexity is hazardous, since that variable
is extremely likely to be strongly endogenous8.
Whatever the best decomposition, the di¤erential in average job complexity
clearly is an important factor that increases the wage di¤erential. Figure 2
depicts the empirical density function of job complexity for men and women.
As we see, women tend to be concentrated in occupations deemed less valuable
and less demanding than those of men.
8In his original paper (Oaxaca 1973), Oaxaca discusses the use of occupational variables
in the decomposition and points out that conditioning on occupation e¤ectively eliminates
one potential source of discrimination. A more satisfactory decomposition would require more
information on individual ability. Then the role of complexity as an intermediate variable
could be clari…ed, as well as the role of …rm selection e¤ects.
85 A theoretical model of ability, complexity and
productivity
The results of the previous section suggest that it is important to study the
process of job assignment in order to evaluate the fairness of women’s pay. This
raises the obvious question: could it be the case that a woman’s expected job
complexity level, conditional on her productive abilities, is lower than that of
her male colleagues? We call this the asymmetric assignment hypothesis. The
rest of the paper is devoted to a theoretical formulation as well as statistical
tests of this hypothesis.
As there is no direct observation of productive ability, and the occupation-
related wage is strongly correlated with the actual wage, there is no direct way
to test the asymmetry hypothesis. However, plausible economic models predict
that the marginal relationship between job complexity and productivity may be
informative on job assignment. This section borrows from the theoretical and
empirical literature on wages, job complexity and job assignment and argues
that the elasticity of an individual’s wage with respect to the complexity level
can reveal something on the relationship between his ability and the complexity
of his job9. By and large, straightforward empirical applications of assignment
models have been relatively few, since the theory operates with variables like job
characteristics and worker ability that are rarely directly observable. Studies
by van Ophem & al. (1993) and Teulings (1995) are important exceptions.
The study by van Ophem & al. in particular elaborates ideas similar to this
paper, especially the notion of a concave relationship between job complexity
and productivity for an individual of given ability.
To begin with, note that the Ricardian model of di¤erential rents and job
assignment, as elaborated by Michael Sattinger (1979), implies that earnings
are a concave function of job complexity for any given individual at the neigh-
bourhood of the optimum assignment point. The di¤erential rents model pre-
supposes that output y is a function y = f(c;a) of the job level c and individual
ability a (assume throughout this section that the price of the product is nor-
malized to unity). It is generally assumed that there is comparative advantage,
so that, in equilibrium, there is a positive relationship between worker ability
and machine complexity. Comparative advantage entails that the function f is
not multiplicatively separable into factor functions of c and a, respectively10.
In the assignment literature, the complexity of the job is traditionally re-
ferred to as the ”size” of the machine that the worker operates. We will use the
terms ”sophistication and ”complexity” as equivalent concepts. Suppose that
9Michael Sattinger (1993) provides an analytic survey of this literature: among the pioneer-
ing papers are those of Tinbergen (1951), Roy (1951) and Sattinger (1975). One conclusion
of this literature is that there is no reason to expect a robust statistical relationship between
worker characteristics and earnings, since the distribution of earnings is mediated by the as-
signment of workers into di¤erent jobs. The papers have also investigated the conditions under
which the distribution of earnings is of a di¤erent shape than the distribution of abilities.
10See Sattinger (1975). As pointed out by Teulings (1995), the function f(c;a) is consistent
with comparative advantage provided the condition facf ¸ fafc holds.
9each …rm owns one machine and employs one worker. Equilibrium assignment
can be characterized in two equivalent ways: either …rms choose the appropriate
ability a of their worker to maximize pro…ts f(c;a)¡w, taking as given a wage
schedule w = w(a) according to which the wage is a function of ability; or the
workers maximize their earnings, f(c;a) ¡ r taking as given a machine rent
schedule according to which the cost of operating a machine is an increasing
function r = r(c) of the size of the machine. Sattinger (1979) shows that, pro-
vided there are no discontinuities in the distributions of machine complexity and
worker ability and that the cross derivative fca is positive everywhere, there is
an equilibrium assignment in which both of the necessary …rst order conditions
are met and the wage and rent functions are both increasing. Furthermore, the
second order condition for the worker’s maximization problem is met11. This
implies that, around equilibrium, earnings are a concave function of machine
complexity for any given individual. The immediate conclusion of the model
is that the marginal e¤ect of increasing complexity is higher than average (i.e.
positive) for any worker whose complexity-ability ratio in the current occupation
is below average.
Such a model, however, implies that the e¤ect, on earnings, of changes in
complexity must always be zero if the economy operates near its optimum. This
is unduly restrictive and we would prefer a richer model that can accommodate
a positive relationship between complexity changes and changes in earnings.
One way to do this is to incorporate worker preferences into the model. Sup-
pose as above that output is a function f(c;a) of complexity (of the machine
operated by the individual) and ability, with fac > 012, and that there is a
cost of capital (rent) r = r(c) associated with the machine. For simplicity, as-
sume that this function is linear, so that r(c) = rc. Furthermore let us make
the assumption that operating complex machines is a stressful activity for the
worker. Thus, increasing machine complexity c decreases the well-being of the
11Sattinger’s argument is as follows. One starts by assuming tentatively that there is an
equlibrium assignment according to which more sophisticated machines are associated with
individuals of higher ability, so that ability a, in equilibrium, is an increasing function a(c) of
machine complexity (throughout, one assumes comparative advantage for able individuals in
complex tasks). From the point of view of the individual worker with ability a¤, maximization
of earnings f(c;a¤)¡r(c) with respect to c leads to the …rst order condition
@f(a¤;c)
@c = r0(c).
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Suppose now that the second order condition for the individual maximization problem above
were not met, i.e.
@2f(a¤;c)
@c2 ¡r00(c) ¸ 0: Assuming that
@2f(a¤;c)
@a@c is always positive, the previ-
ous formula would then imply that @a¤=@c is negative, contradicting the tentative assumption.
Thus, there is a consistent equilibrium assignment in which more complex machines are asso-
ciated with higher ability and each individual optimizes his job level to maximize earnings.
12We make the usual assumptions about f: fc > 0, fa > 0, fcc < 0, faa < 0.
10worker, but the amount of disutility associated with each unit of complexity is
a function of the individual’s ability: for gifted workers, it is less stressful to
operate a sophisticated machine than for less gifted workers. Suppose that the
disutility, measured in pecuniary terms, associated with a unit of complexity is
an increasing function G(c=a) of the ratio of complexity to ability. The disutility
associated with working with a machine of complexity c is then cG(c=a). The
worker maximizes the sum of his wage earnings R(c;a) = f(c;a) ¡ rc less the
disutility term cG(c=a). Consequently, the worker chooses c to maximize utility
U = f(c;a) ¡ rc ¡cG(c=a): (1)
Assume that the function f(c;a) is linear homogeneous. This is perhaps not
a large loss in generality, since we anyhow have no observations on and thus no
scale for ability. The …rst order condition is
fc(c=a) = r +G(c=a) +(c=a)G0(c=a); (2)
so that optimal complexity is a multiple of ability (multiple that depends on
the machine rent factor r):
c=a = Á(r) = Á: (3)
Such a model entails, inter alia, that earnings are a linear function of com-
plexity, when measured over the worker population13.
Suppose now that, for whatever reason, some subset of workers (like women)
operates below the optimalc=a-ratio, and, furthermore, that theability-complexity
di¤erential is proportionally constant. For example, we might assume that
women’s ability is perceived to be lower than their true ability, either because
of prejudiced superiors or because of women’s unduly low self-esteem. Thus, we
assume that perceived ability c¤ is c¤ = (1¡±)c. Therefore, if (3) holds for men,
c = (1¡ ±)Áa; 0 < ± < 1; (4)
holds for women14.
Suppose also that job complexity is subject to shocks. This is a plausible
assumption: as the …rm has to meet the wishes of its di¤erent customers, it must
continuously adjust the exact composition of its production line. Furthermore,
some workers will be absent some of the days and other workers must carry out
the tasks left by the absentees. Workers therefore jump around their optimum
13Since f is neoclassical, earnings are f(c;a) ¡ rc = c[f(1;1=Á) ¡ r] and the cross section
elasticity of earnings with respect to job complexity is unity.
14An alternative assumption would be that the stress function cG(c=a) is more steeply
increasing for women. This would also lead to lower c=a-ratio for women, although in general
not to a constant proportional disadvantage, because of the form of the utility function (1).
11c=a-ratio. Finally, the workers of our subsample who all stay in the industry,
probably advance gradually at least slowly towards more demanding jobs, on
the average15. Consequently, workers shift between di¤erent complexity levels,
although such variation is probably of low magnitude compared to the variation
of job complexity between individuals. Consider ²Rc, the elasticity of earnings
with respect to job complexity, evaluated for a worker of given ability who is at

























a given; c = (1¡±)Áa
(6)
=
cfc(Á(1 ¡ ±)) ¡ rc




so that ²Rc;woman > ²Rc;man holds because of the neoclassical assumptions about
f that we have made (fc(c=a) is a decreasing function). Note that since f is
neoclassical, cfc < f and the formula after the second equality sign in (5) implies
that ²Rc;man is below unity. Thus, if the above model is an adequate description
of production conditions, we have a well-de…ned prediction associated with the
hypothesis of asymmetric assignment: the elasticity of women’s earnings with
respect to job complexity should exceed that of men, for each individual16.
6 Statistical speci…cation
On the basis of the previous section, we propose that the asymmetric assignment
hypothesis be tested by comparing the coe¢cients of job complexity for men
and women in an earnings equation. If the asymmetric assignment hypothesis
is correct, the marginal e¤ect of job complexity on earnings should be higher
for women than for men. Figure 3 illustrates this: if earnings are a concave
function of job complexity and women operate below the c/a-ratio of men, the
slope of the earnings function (for each individual) should exceed that of men.
In Figure 3, we have drawn the concave earnings function plus some …ctive data
points for complexity and earnings for three individuals (or, equivalently, groups
15See the next section on the stationarization of the data.
16As an example of this model, assume that output is just a multiple of machine size c, mul-
tiplied by a factor that indicated how well the skill of the worker matches the sophistication of
the machine: f = c(1+log a
c ). Suppose the worker stress function is G(c=a) = µ log(c=a);where
µ is a parameter. The optimal a=c-ratio is then e
r+µ
1+µ , and the elasticity of earnings with re-
spect to complexity for a male individual becomes ²Rc;men =
µ(1¡r)























































































































































Earnings as a function of
complexity, given ability.
Figure 3: True (as conjectured) and observed pattern of job complexity
and earnings.
of individuals), one with low ability, one with intermediate ability and one with
high ability. Women …nd themselves on a steeper part of their earnings curve
than men.
The same …gure also suggests why a simple OLS regression on a cross section
can not deliver a reliable estimate of the individual slope coe¢cient, since job
complexity is correlated with individual ability. The OLS regression coe¢cient
will then only re‡ect the steepness of the earnings schedule, as a function of
complexity, when workers’ abilities change in pace with machine complexity.
The endogeneity problem can be tackled with instrumental variablemethods,
and exploiting both the time and the cross section dimension of the present
data makes estimation more e¢cient. Thus, we will be working with a familiar
random e¤ects model
wit = Xit¯ + Zi° +®i +´it (7)
in which i indexes individuals and t indexes time. Let T = 6 be the number
of time periods and N = 1396 be the number of individuals. Then wit is
an NT £ 1 vector of observations on individual wages, Xit is an (NT £ k1)
matrix of observations on time-variant variables, Zi is an (NT £ k2) matrix of
observations on time-invariant variables, ®i is an (NT £1) matrix of stochastic
individual intercept terms that capture individual di¤erences in ability, and
´it is an (NT £ 1) disturbance matrix. Observations are indexed …rst over
13individuals and then over time so that the vector ®, for example, is a sequence
of sequences of T identical entries for each individual. Following Hausman and
Taylor, we partition the Xit matrix into two parts, so that Xit = [X1 X2]; where
the submatrix X1 contains those variables that are asymptotically uncorrelated
with the individual ®i-e¤ects and X2 in turn consists of ”endogenous” variables















Since ®i is correlated with the endogenous variables of the Xit matrix, OLS
and GLS estimates of model (7) are biased and inconsistent. There are several
ways of arriving at consistent estimates of ¯ and °. One can transform the equa-
tion by the familiar orthogonal projections operator QV = INT ¡ (IN - 1
T ¶¶0),
which transforms each variable into deviations from individual means (¶ is a T
vector of ones). Estimation of the resulting equation delivers the …xed e¤ect
estimate of ¯, while ° is not identi…ed. A more e¢cient way suggested by Haus-
man and Taylor (1981) is to use the exogenous variables as instruments. The
Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator is the IV estimator of the equation obtained
by multiplying (7) by the familiar matrix18 -¡1=2 = QV + µPV , where PV =
IN - 1
T ¶¶0 transforms the variables into vectors of individual means over time
and µ = (¾2
´=(¾2
´ + T¾2
®)¡1=2. In the IV estimation, X1 and Z1 as well as the
deviations from means of entire X are used as instruments19.
We report the GLS, …xed e¤ects (”within), ”between” as well as the HT
estimates of equation (7). The dependent variable was the log of time wage
from year 1990 through year 1995. The wage and complexity variables were
…rst stationarized by projecting them on time dummies and taking the residual,
in order to eliminate any general e¤ects of in‡ation and productivity growth20.
The variables of the regressor matrices were:
X1: (exogenous, time-variant variables):
² Age and age squared
17In the Hausman-Taylor model, even the Z matrix is partioned in the same way, but in
this analysis we assume no endogenous time-invariant variables.
18The -¡1=2 matrix converts the covariance matrix of the disturbance term into a diagonal
matrix.
19Subsequently, Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986) and Breusch, Mizon and Schmidt (1989)
have suggested estimators that are even more e¢cient, provided stronger exogeneity conditions
are met.
20Note that our balanced panel is a subset of a larger data set that also includes individuals
that leave or enter the industry between years 1990 and 1995. The stationarization was
carried out within the entire sample that also included those workers who were not part of the
balanced sample. This probably leaves a slight upward trend in complexity, since the workers
who are not newcomers nor leave the sample within the period of investigation are likely to be
serious professionals who advance to better occupations. However, stationarizing the sample
within the balanced panel does not change our main estimates and qualitative conclusions in
any signi…cant way.
14² Age and age squared£woman dummy
² Total hours worked
² Firm dummies
² Regional dummy
² Newcomer (was not in the current …rm one year ago)
² Leaver (leaves the current …rm between this observation and the next)
X2: (endogenous time-varying variables):
² Job complexity
² Job complexity£woman dummy
² Personal bonus
² Time share of performance pay
Z1: (exogenous time-invariant variables):
² Total experience
² Gender (woman dummy)
² Firm dummies.
Most of these variables are self-evident. ”Total hours worked” is the sum of
hours worked within all three pay schemes. The regional dummy is a partition
of the data into two classes, metropolitan and rural21. ”Newcomer” denotes a
worker who was not in the current …rm one year ago, and ”leaver” denotes a
worker whose …rm a¢liation changes from this year to the next. ”Time share
of performance pay” denotes the share of piece and premium hours in total
hours22. Firm dummies appear both as time-invariant and time-variant vari-
ables, depending on whether change occurs in the …rm’s workforce during our
period of investigation.
Thecrucial variable of theanalysis is ofcourse the crossvariablecomplexity£
gender. In the estimation, this variable was formulated by multiplying the in-
strumented complexity variable by the female dummy23. We …rst …tted the
model into the pooled sample of men and women and then separately to the
gender subsamples.
21The collective agreement stipulates slightly higher pay in metropolitan areas where the
cost of living is presumably higher.
22See the paper by Brown (1990) who shows that individuals with higher ability are more
likely to work in performance-related pay schemes.
23The commonplace way to use an instrumented cross variable is to instrument the cross
variable in question directly. In our estimation, it is more sensible to instrument only the
job complexity part of the cross variable, since the cross variable is identically zero for men.
Choosing the other method, however, does not change the results.
157 Estimation results
Table 2 reports the results from …tting the model into the pooled sample of
men and women. On theoretical considerations (cf. …gure 3), we expect the
coe¢cient of job complexity to drop when we move from the inconsistent GLS
estimates to the consistent FE and HT estimates. Furthermore, we expect the
coe¢cient of the cross term complexity£gender to be positive if the asymmetric
assignment hypothesis is true. Both of these predictions are borne out by the
estimation results. The coe¢cient of complexity drops from .64 to .37 as one
moves from GLS to HT. The between coe¢cient is 0.82, i.e. not quite unity as
predicted in footnote 13 but not very far from it.
The last line of the table reports Hausman tests of the overidentifying re-
strictions used in the instrumental variable estimations. These Â2-tests are
computed against the …xed e¤ect estimator that is by assumption consistent
but ine¢cient. We see that the null hypothesis of uncorrelated Xit and ®i is
strongly rejected but that the exogeneity assumptions (overidentifying restric-
tions) necessary for the validity of the instruments used in HT estimation are
not, even at a .001 probability level. By and large, the HT estimates are very
similar to the FE (within) estimates, and there appears to be a small increase
in estimation precision for most coe¢cients.
16GLS Between Within HT
Constant -0.1747 -0.1091 -0.2675 -0.0202
(-5.097) (-2.261) (-3.857) (-3.191)
AGE 0.0138 0.0075 0.0170 0.0171
(8.173) (3.177) (7.131) (7.996)
AGE
2 -0.00016 -0.000088 -0.00020 -0.00020
(-7.692) (-2.982) (-6.982) (-7.735)
WOMAN 0.1957 0.0939 0.1079
(2.467) (0.908) (0.959)
AGE£WOMAN -0.0139 -0.0065 -0.0145 -0.0149
(-3.701) (-1.298) (-2.522) (-2.940)
(AGE£WOMAN)
2 0.00018 0.000075 0.00024 0.00023
(3.989) (1.268) (3.644) (3.958)
REGIONAL DUMMY -0.0297 -0.0139 -0.0057 -0.0276
(-4.335) (-1.736) (-0.201) (-1.652)
HOURS 0.000013 -0.000035 0.000013 0.000013
(1.288) (-0.682) (1.283) (1.409)
NEWCOMER -0.0114 -0.1791 -0.0080 -0.0084
(-3.315) (-2.460) (-2.289) (-2.602)
LEAVER -0.0071 0.2173 0.00033 -0.0015
(-1.581) (2.062) (0.073) (-0.349)
TOTAL EXPERIENCE 0.00078 0.0010 -0.00015
(1.028) (1.180) (-0.066)
COMPLEXITY 0.6403 0.8244 0.3678 0.3822
(24.859) (23.256) (9.655) (10.864)
COMPLEXITY£WOMAN 0.0316 0.0206 0.2460 0.2047
(0.606) (0.296) (3.070) (2.822)
PERSONAL BONUS 0.3831 0.7871 0.2392 0.2377
(10.428) (11.072) (5.603) (5.980)
PERFORMANCE SHARE 0.0184 0.0947 -0.0118 -0.0110








Table 2: Estimation results for the pooled sample. Dependent variable: log
of time wage. Endogenous variables underlined. t-values in parentheses below
each estimate. Number of individuals N=1396. 235 …rm dummies were included
in the estimation. The Hausman test statistic of GLS is based on comparing
Within and GLS estimates, and the test statistic of HT is based on comparing
Within and HT estimates. The COMPLEXITY£WOMAN variable was com-
puted by multiplying the instrumented COMPLEXITY variable by WOMAN.
The estimated variance components were: b ¾
2
´ = 0:00439;b ¾
2
® = 0:064;b µ = 0:893:
Tables 3 and 4 report the results from …tting the model separately to the
male and female subsamples. Again, the ordering of the complexity coe¢cients
is as we expected and, furthermore, the complexity coe¢cient is clearly higher
for women than for men. Interestingly, the di¤erence between the GLS com-
17GLS Between Within HT
Constant -0.1988 -0.0975 -0.2448 -0.0247
(-5.493) (-1.710) (-3.809) (-4.647)
AGE 0.0124 0.0049 0.0170 0.0166
(6.946) (1.778) (7.359) (8.028)
AGE2 -0.00015 -0.000051 -0.0002 -0.00020
(-6.569) (-1.509) (-7.302) (-7.881)
HOURS 0.0000062 -0.000072 0.000011 0.000011
(0.586) (-1.173) (0.993) (1.040)
REGIONAL DUMMY -0.0520 -0.0419 -0.0283 -0.0512
(-7.675) (-5.583) (-1.132) (-3.495)
NEWCOMER -0.0091 -0.2659 -0.0069 -0.0070
(-2.381) (-3.282) (-1.798) (-1.966)
LEAVER 0.0021 0.1628 0.0072 0.0058
(0.463) (1.682) (1.556) (1.369)
TOTAL EXPERIENCE 0.0043 0.0036 0.0049
(5.120) (4.047) (2.177)
COMPLEXITY 0.6120 0.8018 0.3647 0.3783
(23.138) (20.841) (9.936) (11.191)
PERSONAL BONUS 0.2938 0.7154 0.1654 0.1613
(6.992) (8.121) (3.498) (3.687)
PERFORMANCE SHARE 0.0054 0.0817 -0.0195 -0.0192
(1.017) (7.539) (-3.208) (-3.425)
Â2(Hausman) Â2
33 = 365:55 Â2
30 = 0:088
(50 …rm dummies)
Table 3: Estimation results for the male subsample. Dependent variable: log
of time wage. Endogenous variables underlined.Number of male individuals
N=1071. 50 …rm dummies were included in the estimation. The estimated
variance components were: b ¾
2
´ = 0:0042;b ¾
2
® = 0:071;b µ = 0:900:
plexity coe¢cient and the HT complexity coe¢cient is lower for women than
men24. We conclude that these estimators corroborate the asymmetric assign-
ment hypothesis, provided that the theoretical model of section 5 is an adequate
description of productivity, complexity and ability.
24This might suggest that the endogeneity phenomenon is less pronounced for women, so
that womens’ job assignment depends less on individual ability than that of men. Without
other analyses, such a conclusion is tentative, of course.
18GLS Between Within HT
Constant -0.1298 -0.0995 -0.4562 -0.0222
(-1.718) (-0.988) (-2.220) (-1.512)
AGE 0.0031 0.0066 0.00083 0.0015
(0.911) (1.485) (0.144) (0.303)
AGE
2 -0.000023 -0.000075 0.000051 0.000033
(-0.576) (-1.460) (0.793) (0.588)
HOURS 0.000032 -0.00016 0.000033 0.000034
(1.435) (-1.561) (1.413) (1.569)
REGIONAL DUMMY -0.0542 -0.0659 0.0943 -0.0303
(-4.986) (-5.458) (0.973) (-0.907)
NEWCOMER -0.0166 0.0653 -0.0100 -0.0111
(-2.339) (0.750) (-1.328) (-1.614)
LEAVER -0.0162 -0.0960 -0.0104 -0.0121
(-1.756) (-0.871) (-1.023) (-1.311)
TOTAL EXPERIENCE 0.00034 0.00052 -0.0030
(0.265) (0.362) (-0.709)
COMPLEXITY 0.7112 0.7782 0.6049 0.5975
(14.378) (11.150) (7.852) (8.543)
PERSONAL BONUS 0.4978 0.6663 0.4916 0.4887
(6.296) (4.463) (5.185) (5.581)
PERFORMANCE SHARE 0.0173 0.0398 0.0066 0.0068








Table 4: Estimation results for the female subsample. Dependent variable: log
of time wage. Endogenous variables underlined. Number of female individuals
N=325. 50 …rm dummies were included in the estimation. The estimated
variance components were: b ¾
2
´ = 0:0052;b ¾
2
® = 0:0671;b µ = 0:889:
We conducted a number of additional statistical investigations to examine
the robustness of these results. Firstly, with a smaller set of …rm dummies,
we computed the Amemiya-MaCurdy and Breusch-Mizon-Schmidt estimates
in addition to the HT estimates. The results were very similar to those of
tables 2 through 4 and are therefore not reported. We also deleted individuals
the observation on whom were exceptionally in‡uential, as measured by the
statistical leverage. This did not change the results either.
Another possible extension has to do with age. Inasmuch as the phenomenon
of asymmetric assignment has to do with women’s childbearing, one might con-
jecture that the asymmetry would weaken with age, as older women who are
unlikely to get children can concentrate on their careers better than those in
childbearing age. Re-estimation of the model on the basis of samples splitted
into younger and older workers, however, does not con…rm this conjecture25.
25In fact, the gender di¤erential between the complexity coe¢cients seems to be a bit lower
for younger workers.
198 Earnings and pay schemes
We have concentrated on time wage earnings, since time wages are the bench-
mark remuneration scheme. If piece rate earnings were available for all workers
and one could assume a more or less uniform level of e¤ort, piece rates could
in principle deliver another reliable observation of individual productivity. By
the same token, women should at each complexity level earn more than men.
Selection into piece work is not random, however. The choice between time pay
and performance pay has been explored by Lazear (1986) and Brown (1990),
who show that the more productive workers choose piece work while the least
productive part of the workforce choose time pay. This is due to a cost of
measuring the output (”counting the pieces”) of the worker. Suppose that a
worker’s output per time unit is q and the cost of measuring output is µ. If
the …rm o¤ers a …xed time wage w, the worker chooses between w and q ¡ µ,
so that piece work is preferred if q > w + µ. Suppose that individual produc-
tivities q are unknown to the …rms who only know their distribution. Lazear
(1986) shows that both piece rate establishments and time rate establishments
(or sections within a …rm) will coexist, so that the more productive workers will
seek employment in piece work and others will prefer time pay. Consequently,
regressions of piece rates should take into account this selection process and
would therefore better be analysed within a more elaborate theoretical model
in which both the assignment and pay scheme selection process are analysed.
There is one prediction, however, implied by the Lazear-Brown framework,
that can be tested fairly easily. If the more productive workers at each complex-
ity level seek pay according to performance, we should observe more willingness
among women to choose piece work or premium work. If one looks at the share
of performance pay hours in workers’ total hours, it turns out the distribution of
this share is starkly bimodal. About a third of the workers are in time pay only,
about a third use predominantly performance pay and the rest are scattered
somewhere in between. If one partitions the worker data, correspondingly, into
three groups and …ts an ordered probability model to explain the choice of the
group, female gender gets a statistically signi…cant positive coe¢cient so that
women indeed are more likely to seek more performance work. This is shown
in Table 5, which reports the results from …tting an ordered logit model with
three alternatives.
9 The earnings gap and personal bonuses
Our last piece of evidence concerns the distribution of personal bonuses. As
indicated in section 2 above, the performance of each worker is evaluated and
a personal bonus is assigned to each worker on top of the task-related wage.
If women are of higher ability than men at all levels of job complexity, their
personal bonuses should on average exceed those of men. A look at the bonuses





JOB COMPLEXITY -0.8285 -6.984
SIZE OF FIRM 0.00070 22.323
NEWCOMER -0.3126 -8.349
LEAVER -0.2060 -5.535
TOTAL HOURS 0.00072 6.114
Table 5: Estimation results for an ordered logit model on the choice of perfor-
mance pay. Denoting the share of performance pay hours by x, the grouping
was based on the following partition of the performance hours share axis: Group
1: x = 0; Group 2: 0 < x < 0:7; Group 3: 0:7 < x < 1. Number of observations
25961, loglikelihood -25401.9, cut points -2.2 and -1.69, respective standard er-
rors 0.433 and 0.433.
Wage group 1 Wage group 2 Wage group 3
Women 9.6% 10.2% 11.1%
Men 10.3% 9.8% 9.2%
Table 6: Average personal bonus in each wage group. Wage group 1 contains
the most complex jobs and wage group 3 the least complex jobs.
most female workers26. Table 6 lists the average personal bonuses of men and
women in each wage group.
There is a statistically signi…cant gap in the bonuses in favour of women in
the lowest wage group where most women tend to work. Interestingly, there is a
reverse gap in the group of complex tasks, but whatever the two sexes’ relative
abilities are in that group, they are of no great signi…cance since few women
work in those tasks.
The model and the results imply that the expected ability of women exceeds
that of men at each complexity level. Can that prediction be accommodated
with the fact that women tend to earn less in general? Not quite. If we estimate
an ANOVA model for time pay earnings in which we condition pay on catego-
rized job complexity variables and …rm dummies, we can ”squeeze” the female
pay disadvantage to little under 3 per cent. This is not much but still of the
wrong sign. Thus, the model cannot be literally true without extra assumptions.
The easiest way out is simply to assume, on top of the model exposed in section
5, that some wage discrimination occurs: although the marginal conditions of
the model hold, some men in some …rms get a positive wage increment on top
of their productivity while some women in some …rms fet a negative increment.
26Recall that the wage grouping partitions the complexity axis in three parts, with the
simplest jobs in group 3 and the demanding tasks in group 1.
21Such an assumption is ad hoc but not unplausible27. A general lesson of these
estimations is that is that the woman dummy coe¢cient is anyway not a very
reliable indicator of women’s wage position, since the …nal wage outcome is me-
diated by many complicated and interacting mechanisms like job assignment,
selection into …rms and di¤erential treatment of age.
10 Conclusion: Interpreting the results
To my knowledge, job complexity and earnings have so far not been analysed
with continuous random e¤ects models. Our results, however, do not contradict
other …ndings. By and large, the fact that women tend to be selected into
less demanding occupations has been observed in many labour markets and
has attracted the attention of labour economists. Furthermore, some recent
studies have shown, at least tentatively, that women need to perform better than
men in order to be promoted. (see in Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller 1997 in
particular)28. Our results are in accordance with those results. Taken literally,
they imply that a female promotion leads to a larger increase in productivity
than a male promotion, on average. A related …nding is reported in a study
of van Ophem & al. (1993), who show that females face a steeper wage pro…le
across job complexity levels29.
Whether womens’ poorer careers are a result of occupational discrimination
or an expression of di¤erent preferences is hard to assess de…nitively, of course.
Sophisticated theoretical explanations for the observed pattern have been devel-
oped by Lazear and Rosen (1990). In their model, women’s alternative occupa-
tion (at home) is more attractive than that of men, which implies that women
are more likely than men to leave the …rm in the post-training situation in which
their productivity in the more complex job has been revealed. An earlier con-
tribution of Becker (1985) builds on the assumption that married women spend
less e¤ort on market work than married men. Interpreted as an outcome of equi-
librium behaviour, our results indicate that the marginal cost of putting women
into more demanding tasks is higher than that for men, which is a result per-
fectly compatible with the Lazear-Rosen model. Such models notwithstanding,
similar results are often interpreted as evidence for discriminatory mechanisms
within the job assignment process.Our model and the empirical results suggest
that there is an unexploited ability potential in women, and many commen-
tators would probably regard this as a ”problem” to be mended regardless of
27Thus, to generate the empirical result, it is su¢cient that some large …rms practice wage
discrimination. Indeed, it turns out that the negative female coe¢cient depends a lot on which
…rms are selected into the estimation.
28Not all empirical results fall into the same pattern, however; Hersch and Viscusi, for
example, in their investigation of a public utility, …nd that promotions increase wages more
for men than for women (Hersch and Viscusi 1996). That result may be due the di¤erent
character of a public utility which needs to be less concerned about individual productivity.
29van Ophem & al. suggest that this may indicate that the earnings disadvantage of women
diminishes with job complexity. In the light of our results, this is not the only possible
explanation, of course.
22whether it re‡ects optimizing behaviour or discrimination.
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